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In October 2020 the OECD released nearly 500 
pages of blueprints on its pillars 1 and 2 projects 
on the tax challenges arising from digitalization. 
Pillar 2 represents an effort to create a widely 
accepted global minimum tax. I address only 
pillar 1 here.
The blueprint for pillar 1 is the result of two 
years of admirable, herculean efforts by the 
OECD, with the support of the G-20 and the 137 
countries of the inclusive framework, to create 
nexus and profit allocation rules more 
appropriate to the 21st-century economy. This 
endeavor, which carries on from the OECD’s base 
erosion and profit-shifting work, attempts to 
prevent the proliferation of widespread and 
divergent laws — often based on gross receipts 
rather than profits — to collect taxes where sales 
or data from resident users of digital services play 
an important role in generating profits for a 
multinational enterprise without those profits 
being subject to income tax in that jurisdiction.1
Unfortunately, the basic principles 
undergirding pillar 1 are often buried in the 
OECD’s complex 230-page blueprint. Almost all of 
the many pages of comments on pillar 1 submitted 
in December 2020 address technical aspects of the 
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In this report, Graetz suggests major 
modifications to the OECD’s pillar 1 blueprint 
proposal to create a new taxing right for 
multinational digital income and some product 
sales that would greatly simplify the proposal. 
The modifications rely on readily available 
existing financial information and would 
achieve certainty in the application of pillar 1, 
while adhering to its fundamental structure 
and policies.
Copyright 2021 Michael J. Graetz. 
All rights reserved.
1
OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation — Report on 
Pillar 1 Blueprint” (Oct. 14, 2020) (hereinafter “pillar 1 blueprint”).
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blueprint. Many complain — appropriately in my 
view — that the novel and complex concepts and 
rules in the pillar 1 blueprint will require new and 
contestable calculations not now being produced 
either for tax or financial accounting purposes.2 
Others complain about the arbitrariness of 
outcomes under pillar 1 and express concerns 
about the potential for double taxation. Many 
express distress that, in its current form, pillar 1 
will inevitably produce high compliance costs, 
uncertain outcomes, and multiple and conflicting 
national claims for revenues. The capacity of 
many developing countries to administer the 
pillar 1 blueprint is also uncertain.
Importantly, the multitude and complexity of 
ambiguities and potential conflicts undermine the 
OECD’s insistence that it is essential to ensure 
certainty in results (to be facilitated by new 
dispute resolution mechanisms).3 They threaten 
the viability of pillar 1 (and perhaps also pillar 2 
because some countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, take the view that if pillar 1 fails, so 
should pillar 2). These problems with the pillar 1 
blueprint cannot be fixed through mere tinkering.
I will describe here the foundational 
principles and basic policy decisions underlying 
the pillar 1 blueprint and offer a much simpler 
and more certain alternative that relies on 
information currently being produced for other 
reasons. In doing so, I generally accept the 
principles and many of the policy decisions 
reflected in the blueprint. Much of the blueprint’s 
structure, however, contributes substantially to its 
astounding complexities without being required 
by the principles and policies that motivate the 
fundamental changes pillar 1 proposes. I begin 
with the fundamental principles of the blueprint.
I. The Fundamental Principles of Pillar 1
A. Taxable Profits Without a Physical Presence
Nearly four decades ago, the U.S. Supreme 
Court said that “allocating income among various 
taxing jurisdictions bears some resemblance . . . to 
slicing a shadow.”4 Two decades later, I pointed 
out that MNEs’ methods of doing business had 
undermined the basic rules for determining the 
source of various categories of income.5 More 
recently, in making the obvious point that current 
source rules were developed long ago for a very 
different world economy and need updating to 
limit tax avoidance techniques involving 
intellectual property, Rachael Doud and I urged 
an allocation of some revenues to countries of 
sales to limit profit shifting and achieve greater 
alignment between a nation’s sales and its taxable 
income.6 Many others agree.7
Pillar 1 is based on a judgment by the inclusive 
framework that a country that produces for an 
MNE a substantial amount of sales or revenue 
derived from the monetization of data supplied 
by domestic users of digital services is entitled to 
an allocation of some profits, whether or not the 
MNE has any physical presence within that 
country’s borders.
Formulary appointment of some share of 
profits to the jurisdiction where sales occur has 
long been a feature of the subnational divisions of 
business income taxes in Canada, Switzerland, 
and the United States, and has been suggested as 
a mechanism for the allocation of revenues under 
the proposed common consolidated corporate tax 
base proposal in Europe.8 In 2018 the U.S. 
Supreme Court properly concluded that limiting 
income taxation based on sales to businesses that 
2
A good example is the comments from the coalition Business at 
OECD (BIAC) (Dec. 14, 2020) (hereinafter “BIAC Comments”). For all 
public comments on pillar 1 (and pillar 2), see “OECD Comments 
Received on Reports on Pillar 1, Pillar 2 Blueprints” (Dec. 16, 2020).
3
Pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at chapter 9.
4
Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 1594 
(1983). See also David Bradford and Hugh Ault, “Taxing International 
Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises,” in 
Taxation in the Global Economy 11, 30-31 (1990): “The source of income is 
not a well-defined economic idea.”
5
See Michael J. Graetz, Follow the Money: Essays on International 
Taxation 83-134 (2016). Originally published as “Taxing International 
Income: Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies,” 54 
Tax L. Rev. 261 (2001).
6
Id. at 213-219 (originally published as Graetz and Rachael Doud, 
“Technological Innovation, International Competition and the 
Challenges of International Income Taxation,” 113 Colum. L. Rev. 347 
(2013)).
7
E.g., Alan J. Auerbach, “A Modern Corporate Tax,” Center for 
American Progress (Dec. 2010); Auerbach, Michael P. Devereux, and 
Helen Simpson, “Taxing Corporate Income,” in Mirrlees Review: 
Dimensions of Tax Design 837, 882-888 (2020); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Kimberly Clausing, and Michael Durst, “Allocating Business Profits for 
Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,” 9 Fla. Tax 
Rev. 497 (2009); and Devereux et al., Taxing Profit in a Global Economy 
(coming 2021).
8
See Walter Hellerstein, “Reflections on the Cross-Border Tax 
Challenges of the Digital Economy,” Tax Notes Int’l, Nov. 25, 2019, p. 671; 
and South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2095 (2018).
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have a physical presence is now unsound and 
each year “becomes further removed from 
economic reality.”9
Under pillar 1 some portion of profits — 
labeled amount A — would be allocated to the 
market/user country. This new taxing right would 
not fully replace the current allocation of profits to 
countries where income is produced under 
existing source rules, arm’s-length pricing 
allocations, and income tax treaties. For the 
market country to receive an allocation of a 
portion of profits under pillar 1, a threshold 
amount of sales or other revenues, such as 
advertising revenues, must occur in (or be 
attributable to) that country.10
It is important that the OECD succeed in its 
effort to achieve widespread multilateral 
agreement to allocate revenues from some portion 
of MNE profits to countries with substantial 
amounts of sales or revenues derived from the 
monetization of data derived from digital 
services. Businesses or countries that view the 
status quo as an alternative to pillar 1 are 
engaging in an unrealistic and futile comparison. 
By my count, there are now at least 36 countries, 
plus the European Union, that have announced or 
enacted digital services taxes or withholding taxes 
on gross revenues from sales or specified offshore 
digital services or an equalization levy based on 
domestic sales or residents’ use of digital services 
within their borders. Over time, given growing 
frustrations with the existing allocations of 
revenues and the increasing role of digital 
products and services, the variety of unilateral 
measures will undoubtedly expand and existing 
ones will mutate, increasing their scope and 
reach.
Typically, these laws layer additional taxes on 
top of existing income taxes and VAT. Some are 
based on gross revenues (which operate like 
special additional VAT rates or ad valorem 
excises) and others on a share of profits. Efforts by 
MNEs to obtain credits for such taxes from their 
headquarters or parent country will be of little 
avail. And if the U.S. response to France’s digital 
services tax is a harbinger, retaliatory tariffs and 
trade disputes may follow the imposition of such 
taxes. Chaotic unilateral measures and 
unpredictable counter measures are therefore the 
baseline against which the OECD’s pillar 1 effort 
must be evaluated.
B. Avoid Double Taxation
For over a century, avoiding double taxation 
of income has been a goal of taxpayers, countries, 
and the OECD in multilateral and bilateral 
income tax treaty arrangements.11 But double 
taxation is omnipresent: Classical corporate 
income taxation taxes business income twice; 
wages are subject to payroll and income taxes 
when earned and then to sales taxes, VAT, or 
excise taxes when spent. The OECD policy 
decision to avoid double taxation should be 
understood to mean that — unlike the unilateral 
digital taxes — an allocation of profits to market/
user countries under pillar 1 should be in lieu of 
income taxes allocated to other source or 
residence countries rather than in addition to 
those taxes. Accordingly, the goal of pillar 1 
should be viewed as updating and modifying the 
source rules to reallocate some revenue, rather 
than creating a new tax.
This means that the allocation of a portion of 
profits to a market/user country will increase an 
MNE’s taxes only when the tax rate applied in the 
market jurisdiction is higher than in the 
jurisdiction with its current allocation of revenues 
reduced as an offset. This seems appropriate even 
though it requires answering the difficult 
question of which countries’ revenues will be 
reduced to offset amount A’s allocation of profits 
to market/user countries. The blueprint’s effort to 
identify the entities whose profits will be reduced 
to offset reallocations of amounts A is contained 
in a complex and controversial chapter.12 I address 
that issue in Section III.
9
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
10
I focus here on amount A of pillar 1. Pillar 1 also contains an 
amount B intended to provide a routine return for the remuneration of 
related-party distributors that perform “baseline marketing and 
distribution activities” in a market jurisdiction. Amount B is apparently 
controversial, especially with developing countries, and I do not regard 
it as essential element to the transformation attempted by pillar 1. I limit 
my comments here to the calculation of amount A, although the 
revisions to amount A suggested here may also implicate (or even 
eliminate the need for) amount B.
11
See, e.g., Follow the Money, supra note 5, at 19-24 (originally 
published as Graetz and Michael M. O’Hear, “The Original Intent of U.S. 
International Taxation,” 46 Duke L.J. 1021 (1997)).
12
Pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 7.
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C. Formulary Allocation
The OECD properly describes the allocation 
of amount A to the market/user countries as based 
on a formula rather than on arm’s-length pricing 
methods. Amount A is calculated by allocating to 
market countries a fixed percentage (described as 
10 to 30 percent, but presumably 20 percent) of 
residual profits calculated alternatively based on 
a profit amount or a profit margin approach. In 
either case, the result is equivalent to a formulary 
apportionment of a portion of profits based on the 
ratio of local sales revenue to worldwide sales 
revenue — a familiar method analogous to the 
sales-based formulary apportionments used by 
U.S. states.13
Combining arm’s-length pricing and a 
formulary allocation is inherently complex and 
may be difficult to justify analytically. But as a 
prudent political matter it is hardly surprising 
that the OECD decided to move only 
incrementally away from current practices — and 
to limit this move to large MNEs with business 
activities sufficient to make them vulnerable to 
the unilateral market-based and digital taxes 
springing up around the world.
II. Establishing the Scope of Allocation
The pillar 1 blueprint circumscribes 
allocations to market/user countries along several 
dimensions. First, the allocation applies only to 
consumer-facing businesses or automated digital 
services (ADS) above specified thresholds of 
worldwide sales or revenues and with a 
substantial amount of business activity in the user 
jurisdiction.14 Second, the portion of worldwide 
profits allocated to market/user countries is based 
on an MNE’s worldwide book (rather than 
taxable) income. Third, amount A to be allocated 
to the market country is a fixed percentage of 
residual profits.
A. Determining In-Scope MNEs
The OECD limits the allocation of amount A 
profits to consumer-facing businesses and ADS. A 
14-page chapter of the blueprint describes 
businesses it would include and exclude.
Including MNEs with consumer-facing 
businesses in the scope of the proposal is justified 
or the ground that these are the kinds of 
companies for which the existence of a market is 
essential to the production of income. The 
inclusion of ADS businesses that monetize data 
provided by online services is necessary if pillar 1 
is to serve as an effective substitute for the 
unilateral digital taxes now proliferating.15 A 
formulary allocation of some portion of profits to 
user countries based on revenues from 
advertising would capture some of the profits 
from data digitization, but this is not the only way 
in which users’ data is monetized. Indeed, 
ongoing expansions of the internet of things 
means that the ways that users’ data can now be 
monetized are proliferating across the economy in 
contexts and methods not captured by the 
blueprint’s determinations of in-scope business 
activities.
Distinguishing business activities in scope 
from those out of scope necessarily requires 
difficult and contestable line drawing. 
Unfortunately, this is only the first step. The 
blueprint also requires many additional 
distinctions and segmentations for in-scope 
businesses in determining allocations of amounts 
A and in computing offsets of paying entities in 
other jurisdictions to prevent double taxation.
13
When a portion of profits is allocated to the market/user country, 
this is obvious. When the amount is based on profit margins, the 
equivalence to formulary sales apportionment may be obscure but is 
demonstrated by the following simple algebra:
(1) Standard formulary apportionment of profits (where P = 
worldwide profits, L = local sales, W = worldwide sales):
Formulary allocation of Profits by Sales taxed at rate t:
t * P (L/W)
(2) With apportionment based on worldwide profit margins rather 
than profits (where profit margin is P/W), the tax is exactly the 
same as the allocated profits tax above:
t * (P/W)L.
14
A high threshold for business activity in the market/user 
jurisdiction may exclude some developing countries from an allocation 
of amount A. The OECD may regard this as necessary, given the 
complexity and inevitable administrative costs and complexities of the 
pillar 1 blueprint, but the simplification suggested here, relying on 
formulas and existing information, may allow a lower threshold of such 
activity.
15
If instead of exchanging free services for user data, an ADS paid for 
such data, the users would be required to pay personal income taxes on 
the fees they receive. Those taxes would go to the countries where the 
users reside. In addition, those countries might also impose VAT on the 
consumption of those services. Because these transactions are bartered 
rather than priced, the users’ countries lose both personal income tax 
and VAT revenues, whether the supplier of the services is domestic or 
foreign. Rather than taxing the users on the value of their barters, as a 
practical substitute it should be possible to impose tax on the providers, 
with an amount of profits allocated to the countries where the users 
reside.
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Subnational jurisdictions in the United States 
do not limit the application of their sales-based 
formulary apportionment to consumer-facing or 
ADS businesses as the blueprint does. Expanding 
formulary apportionment of a portion of profits to 
business activities that are currently out of scope 
of the OECD blueprint — perhaps with limited 
exceptions, such as for natural resources where 
profits are location-specific — would eliminate 
distinctions among lines of business that cause 
complexity in the application of pillar 1.16 
However, extending amount A substantially 
beyond the current scope of the blueprint seems 
unrealistic.17 I therefore do not reevaluate the 
blueprint’s choices here, but instead endeavor to 
eliminate the additional distinctions and 
segmentations the blueprint requires.
The amount A allocation is also limited to 
large MNEs — defined by global revenue — that 
have more than a threshold amount of in-scope 
revenue in the market/user country.18 The 
blueprint estimates that a global revenue 
threshold of €750 million to €5 billion would limit 
application of the pillar 1 formulary allocation to 
2,300 to 620 MNEs, respectively. A threshold 
based on gross revenues to exclude small and 
medium-size enterprises is obviously sensible to 
limit compliance and administrative costs for 
taxpayers and governments and is taken up in 
Section II.D.
B. Using Worldwide Book Measures of Income
In nations such as the United States that use 
formulary apportionment of some portion of 
profits to subnational jurisdictions, the 
apportionment of income to sales is based, at least 
initially, on a uniform definition of taxable income 
at the national level. In contrast, the OECD effort 
does not start with the advantage of any uniform 
worldwide calculation of taxable income. Instead, 
the blueprint uses consolidated financial accounts 
based on international financial reporting 
standards (or in some cases generally accepted 
accounting principles) with a limited number of 
prescribed adjustments as its starting point in 
determining amount A.19
I do not question here the decision to use book 
profits.20 I do, however, urge using existing 
financial reporting information without requiring 
companies to create new and contestable 
segmentations of that information. Financial 
reports should also be used to exclude companies 
with less than a specified amount of in-scope 
revenues.
C. Allocating a Portion of Residual Profits
In reallocating amount A to market/user 
countries, the OECD allocates a fixed percentage, 
presumably 20 percent, of the excess of profits 
over a specified threshold of profits — defined as 
the excess of profits over some fixed percentage of 
sales or service revenues (which the blueprint 
frequently describes as 10 percent). It labels this 
amount “residual profits.” The two-step process 
is necessary because pillar 1 allocates only a 
portion of residual profits to market/user 
countries.
When an MNE has in-scope consumer-facing 
business and/or ADS revenues above the 
thresholds and also has substantial profits from 
businesses that are out of scope, a division of 
profits is necessary. The necessary separations 
between in- and out-of-scope activities should be 
based on disclosures routinely made in financial 
statements.21 However, the method for allocating 
only residual profits to market/user countries 
requires numerous additional segmentations 
when profit margins differ significantly across 
different lines of business.16See also Itai Grinberg, “Design of Scope Limitations for OECD Pillar 
1 Work,” Tax Notes Federal, June 15, 2020, p. 1843.
17
To take just one example, the exclusion of financial services for 
individual consumers seems more likely grounded in political than 
analytical reasoning. For comments questioning the blueprint’s 
determinations, see, e.g., BIAC comments and those of Johnson and 
Johnson.
18
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wayfair concluding 
that no physical presence is required for a state to tax online sales, most 
states embraced the thresholds prescribed by the statute at issue in that 
case and applied the new rules only to sellers of more than $100,000 of 
goods or services or more than 200 transactions in the state in a given 
year. A few states adopted thresholds of $500,000. See Hellerstein, supra 
note 8; and Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
19
Pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 5. IFRS is more widely used 
and perhaps more uniform in its applications than GAAP.
20
The pillar 2 blueprint makes some adjustments to book income to 
reflect a limited number of book-tax differences. It is not clear whether 
the OECD intends to make similar adjustments under pillar 1. I do not 
evaluate here which adjustments are apt.
21
The divisions required by IFRS 8 for operating segments should 
suffice for this purpose.
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Consider, for example, Amazon, whose 
activities are either consumer-facing or ADS 
businesses, and is obviously intended to be in-
scope. In some recent years, Amazon has earned 
no residual profits before taxes. Martin A. 
Sullivan has estimated that Amazon’s pretax 
profit in 2017 was 2 percent.22 But Amazon’s low 
overall profit margin reflects a mix of low-profit 
business (from physical stores and in some cases 
online sales) and higher-profit businesses (from 
cloud computing, some third-party seller 
services, and various subscription services).
To take just one other example clearly 
intended to be in scope, consider Apple, which 
has large residual profits (28 percent pretax 
profits in 2017).23 Apple’s growth in profits and 
sales has historically been driven by products: the 
iPhone (which accounted for half or more of total 
sales revenue); the Mac computer (which 
accounted for just under 10 percent); the iPad 
(which accounted for about 8 percent); wearables, 
like AirPods and the Apple Watch, and home 
accessories (which together accounted for about 9 
percent). In recent years, however, the company’s 
revenue and especially its profitability growth 
have slowed from its products and instead have 
come mostly from digital services, including 
subscriptions to Apple Music and apps, 
AppleCare warranties, and iCloud storage 
services.24 It is uncertain under the OECD’s 
segmentation requirements to allocate residual 
profits whether Apple has two lines of business — 
products and services — or at least 11, including 
iPhones, Mac computers, iPads, AirPods, Apple 
Watches, home accessories, Apple Music, Apple 
TV, the App Store, AppleCare warranties, and 
iCloud services. The answer may turn — but not 
necessarily — on how Apple divides its lines of 
business for financial reporting businesses.25 
Profitability — and therefore residual profits — in 
various jurisdictions also differs among the 11 
lines of business.
Segmenting lines of business to determine 
which have residual profits in excess of the 
threshold (presumably 10 percent) requires 
allocating both costs and revenues to different 
lines of business. Some companies already do this 
for financial reporting or transfer pricing 
purposes, but others do not. The OECD is 
apparently concerned that allocating only 
residual profits without segmenting profit 
margins by in-scope lines of business would 
exclude companies that do not meet the residual-
profit threshold for all their in-scope lines of 
business. The Amazon example suggests (for 2017 
at least) that the company does not have profits in 
excess of the 10 percent routine profit threshold 
and therefore might be excluded despite its large 
residual profits — for example, from cloud 
computing.26
As the examples illustrate, there are 
numerous ways to segment businesses in 
determining the amount A residual profit 
allocations. The blueprint describes a hierarchy 
that applies to each type of in-source revenue.27 It 
also says that further segmentation might be 
required to account for different degrees of 
digitization among in-scope business activities or 
for variations in profitability among different 
market segments. It calls these “digital 
differentiation” and “jurisdictional 
segmentation.”28
The blueprint also discusses various 
modifications of its formulas for determining 
residual profits and even profitability thresholds, 
called “differentiation mechanisms,” which are 
intended to take into account different degrees of 
digitalization among various in-scope business 
activities and variations in determining residual 
profits of in-scope MNEs in different market/user 
jurisdictions.2922
Sullivan, “OECD Pillar 1 ‘Amount A’ Shakes Up Worldwide Profit,” 
Tax Notes Federal, Feb. 24, 2020, p. 1238. Sullivan’s calculations for 2017 
suggest that other U.S. MNEs, such as Caterpillar and Broadcom, have 
profits of 10 percent or less, and many others, such as IBM and Boeing, 




Shoshanna Delventhal, “Apple’s 5 Most Profitable Businesses,” 
Investopedia, Mar. 10, 2020.
25
See pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 6. Even if so, this may not 
reflect how Apple’s various entities are organized, which will be relevant 
for determining the “paying entities” and jurisdictions discussed in 
Section III.
26
This exclusion would not occur if all in-scope profits of a company 
like Amazon were allocated under amount A.
27
As the next section describes, different segmentations are also 
necessary to determine the “paying entities” and jurisdictions. See pillar 
1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 3, 4, 5, and 7.
28
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If each jurisdiction decides what profitability 
threshold and reallocation percentage to use and 
then whether to apply a differentiation 
mechanism, chaos will reign. If these kinds of 
differences among nations are permitted, pillar 1 
will not ameliorate the kinds of unilateral 
measures to tax digital services and market-based 
profits that have stimulated the OECD’s efforts. A 
high degree of uniformity seems essential. 
Moreover, the potential variations seem rather 
arbitrary and undermine the rationale for using 
complex determinations of residual profits with 
their inevitably controversial allocations of costs 
based on segmentations that serve only to create 
illusions of precision where there is none.30
The blueprint recognizes that large 
compliance costs and administrative burdens will 
occur as a result of the way it intends to measure 
residual profits for the segmentations it would 
require beyond the necessary distinctions 
between in- and out-of-scope businesses. 
Disputes and controversies over segmentations 
and the allocations of revenues and costs to them 
are inevitable. To limit these costs and 
controversies, the pillar 1 blueprint indicates its 
willingness to rely on multinational group 
financial statements — as long as the financial 
statements meet “agreed hallmarks.”
When countries see their results, based on an 
MNE’s financial statement segmentations, they 
might want to demand changes, but there is no 
reason to expect all countries to want the same 
changes. And when MNEs see the results under 
their existing financial accounting practices, they 
might try to aggregate or disaggregate products 
or services into different segmentations. After all, 
the prices of their securities turn on their overall 
profitability, not necessarily how they segment 
their lines of business in their financial 
statements.
The OECD’s decision to reallocate amount A 
to market/user jurisdictions based only on a 
specified percentage of residual profits, rather 
than reallocating a smaller fixed percentage of all 
of the profits of a MNE’s in-scope activities, 
introduces serious complexities and uncertainties 
into the pillar 1 blueprint contrary to the OECD’s 
efforts to achieve certainty and reduce 
complexity.31 It makes the blueprint’s claim that 
“securing tax certainty is an essential element of 
Pillar 1” implausible.32
The OECD’s decision to allocate a portion of 
only residual profits may have evolved from its 
desire to maintain and move only incrementally 
from existing profit splits that sometimes entitle 
market countries to a share of revenues from 
residual profits under the arm’s-length method.33 
It also limits the blueprint’s departure from 
existing permanent establishment rules to 
situations in which residual profits are present. So 
the limitation to residual profits may simply be 
one way in which the OECD appears to be hewing 
closely to existing practices. But the costs of doing 
so in the manner that the blueprint requires are 
large and the justifications small or nonexistent.
Limiting amount A to residual profits reflects 
a decision that market/user countries are entitled 
only to a share of entrepreneurial and other 
synergies that produce profits for an MNE in 
excess of those that could be produced by the 
MNE’s related parties operating independently. 
Under arm’s-length pricing, the allocation of 
entrepreneurial and synergistic profits requires 
an intense factual case-by-case inquiry for MNEs 
with difficult-to-value intangible assets 
(including both production and marketing 
intangibles) that contribute to residual profits.
In transfer pricing parlance, routine profits are 
the profits that a third party would earn in 
performing activities conducted by a related party 
that does not share in the overall risks and 
synergies of the MNE.34 Those routine profits are 
assumed to arise in the country where the 
activities take place. But the distinction between 
routine and residual profits of related enterprises 
and the allocation to particular entities and 
countries under arm’s-length principles is hardly 
30
For some MNEs, distinguishing in-scope from out-of-scope profits 
may require similar, if less intricate, determinations of profits, but that 
can be solved only by eliminating the scoping distinctions or basing 
them exclusively on financial statements.
31
See discussion in ch. 6 of the pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1.
32
See id. at 168 and ch. 9.
33
See OECD, “Revised Guidance on the Application of the 
Transactional Profit Split Method: Inclusive Framework on BEPS: Action 
10” (June 2018).
34
For further discussion, see Devereux et al., “Residual Profit 
Allocation by Income,” Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
WP 19/01 (Mar. 2019).
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straightforward, as transfer pricing controversies 
amply demonstrate.35
Some authors have argued for an allocation of 
all residual profits to market jurisdictions based 
on each country’s proportion of worldwide sales 
or, alternatively, after allocating all routine profits 
to the jurisdictions where employees or physical 
capital are deployed.36 But — even if residual 
profits were defined in a manner to reflect profits 
attributable to synergies of an MNE that do not 
have any particular location — allocating all 
profits in excess of a routine return to market/user 
countries would shortchange countries that 
produce residual profits through production 
intangibles, headquarters activities, and research 
and development. If it were practical to separate 
out the residual profits attributable to marketing 
intangibles and allocate those — or a substantial 
portion of those — to market countries, that could 
be defended conceptually.37 But recognizing this is 
impractical, the OECD resorted to a formulary 
method for determining the allocable amount A, 
along with an effort to ensure the allocation of 
some routine profits to marketing and 
distributional activities (which it calls amount 
B).38
Limiting amount A reallocations to residual 
profits may reflect a judgment by the OECD that 
allocating residual profits to the market/user 
countries will reduce tax planning opportunities 
that now enable MNEs to shift income from IP (or 
financial capital) to low- or zero-tax countries.39 In 
those terms, pillar 1 could be viewed as an 
extension of the OECD’s BEPS efforts, but, as 
Section III shows, limiting amount A to residual 
profits is not necessary for that.40
The OECD’s pillar 1 blueprint endeavors: (1) 
not to duplicate residual profits currently 
allocated to market countries under profit splits; 
(2) to determine when market countries already 
receive sufficient revenues under existing profit-
split methods; (3) to determine residual profits on 
a segmented line-of-business basis often not 
required for either tax or financial reporting 
purposes; and (4) to develop (inevitably 
controversial) rules regarding the identification of 
paying entities and countries that will give up the 
revenue allocated to market/user countries.41
If providing a market and users who supply 
data that produce profits for an MNE entitles a 
country to a share of revenues from those profits, 
why is it sound to limit such claims to complex 
arbitrary computations of residual profits? The 
answer must be grounded in existing practices 
and the OECD’s desire for only incremental 
change. But, as I have described, the status quo is 
not stable. Market/user countries are taxing, and 
will continue to tax, revenues beyond those to 
which they are entitled under current 
international income tax nexus and transfer 
pricing rules — and even when there are no 
profits. In limiting amount A to its calculations of 
residual profits by lines of business, the OECD 
has produced a convoluted and controversial 
structure that in the absence of universal 
agreement on the application of its segmentation 
decisions — which certainly will not happen — 
guarantees the kinds of uncertainties, 
complexities, and controversies that the OECD 
insists it wants to avoid.
It would be far simpler, and at least as 
defensible in principle, to allocate a portion of all 
profits (and losses) of in-scope companies to 
market/user countries.42 This, of course, is what 
35
For recent examples, see, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Commissioner, 900 
F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2018), rev’g T.C. Memo. 2016-12; and Coca-Cola Co. v. 
Commissioner, 155 T.C. No. 10 (2020).
36
See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, supra note 7; and 
Devereux et al., supra note 7.
37
Allocation of profits to production intangibles is obviously no 
easier. My Treasury experience dealing with controversies leading up to 
the enactment of section 197, relating to the amortization of purchased 
intangibles (making no attempt to distinguish among production and 
marketing intangibles), makes this clear.
38
I do not discuss amount B here, although allocating all profits of in-
scope MNEs, rather than only residual profits, might eliminate the need 
for a separate amount B.
39
Some economists contend that business income taxation should 
apply only to “economic rents” and that those rents should be allocated 
to market countries, typically as destination-based cash flow taxes. See, 
e.g., Devereux et al., supra note 7.
40
As Section III describes, this can be accomplished by requiring the 
offsets to the amount A allocations by “paying entities” to come out of 
residual profits based on country-by-country reports. These calculations 
also show that when an MNE’s entities total positive residual profits are 
less than the percentage of profits allocated to market/user countries, 
amount A will be reduced to that total. See infra note 58.
41
See pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 6 and 7.
42
Limiting the amount A allocation to situations where an MNE 
meets an overall residual profit threshold, such as 10 percent, is possible, 
but, as indicated above, this would eliminate companies like Amazon 
when overall profit margins do not exceed the threshold.
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happens in formulary apportionments of business 
income to U.S. states. And it is what the G-24 
working group of developing countries has 
requested.43
The OECD estimates that its reallocation of 
amount A residual profits to market jurisdictions 
by in-scope MNEs above a €750 million threshold 
would shift less than 1 percent of global corporate 
income tax revenues from low- to higher tax-rate 
jurisdictions.44 The estimates imply that a 
percentage allocation to market/user jurisdictions 
of all such profits of about 10 percent would 
produce a revenue reallocation similar to that 
estimated by the OECD with a 20 percent 
allocation of residual profits and a 10 percent 
profitability threshold.45
Formulary allocation of some percentage of all 
profits — with the percentage set to produce 
revenues in market/user countries roughly 
comparable to those estimated to be allocated 
under amount A of the pillar 1 blueprint — would 
effectuate a dramatic simplification of pillar 1. If a 
fixed percentage of all profits were allocated to 
such countries, segmentation would be limited to 
the distinction between in- and out-of-scope 
activities. In essence, this rule would require a 
formulary allocation based on sales or revenues of 
consumer-facing or ADS businesses of a specified 
percentage of the net profits (and losses) of MNEs 
within the scope of pillar 1.46 The remainder of the 
MNE’s profits would be allocated under existing 
arm’s-length principles.
D. Selecting Thresholds and Percentages
Determining what portion of profit to allocate 
to market/user countries is necessarily a political 
exercise. As I have described, under the blueprint, 
the residual profit of an MNE is based on the 
excess of the MNE’s worldwide profit over a 
profitability threshold.47 The potential 
profitability thresholds in the blueprint range 
from 8 to 25 percent. The blueprint also describes 
a range of reallocation percentages of residual 
profits to be allocated as amount A that range 
from 10 to 30 percent. The OECD estimates of the 
total global residual profits allocable to market 
jurisdictions vary based on 15 different 
combinations of reallocation percentages and 
profitability thresholds. These produce estimated 
total revenues allocable to market jurisdictions 
under amount A that range from $10 billion to 
$147 billion.48 Obviously, many more possible 
variations exist. As one specific example, the 
blueprint observes that a 10 percent profitability 
threshold and a 20 percent reallocation 
percentage would allocate just under $100 billion 
to market/user jurisdictions.49 As I have indicated, 
if all profits (rather than residual profits) were 
allocated to user jurisdictions, the allocation 
percentage could be reduced by about half.
Even though it is based on 2016-2017 data and 
has other data limitations, the OECD’s 2020 
analysis of the economic impact of pillar 1 sheds 
additional light on the potential for political 
acceptance of a fixed percentage allocation of 
profits to market/user jurisdictions.50 The report 
estimates a total of $415 billion to $493 billion in 
residual profits for in-scope MNEs (as defined in 
the pillar 1 blueprint) with gross revenue 
thresholds ranging from €750 million to €5 
billion.51 With a profitability threshold of 10 
percent, the difference between a threshold of 
€750 million (which the OECD blueprint 
emphasizes) and €2 billion is only €27 billion, 
about 5.5 percent of the residual profits at the €750 
million level.52 This suggests that a higher 
threshold of up to €2 billion might produce 
43
G-24, “Comments of the G-24 on the OECD Secretariat Proposal for 
a Unified Approach to the Nexus and Profit Allocation Challenges 




This estimate is based on estimates of U.S. residual profits of about 
half of profits and somewhat lower global residual profits. See, e.g., 
Kartikeya Singh, W. Joe Murphy, and Gregory J. Ossi, “The OECD’s 
Unified Approach — An Analysis of the Revised Regime for Taxing 
Rights and Income Allocation,” Tax Notes Int’l, Feb. 3, 2020, p. 549.
46
Allocations of amount A could be further limited to situations 
where market/user countries are not allocated a substantial portion of an 
MNE’s in-scope profits, say 25 percent, under current arm’s-length 
pricing.
47






OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation — Economic 
Impact Assessment” (Oct. 12, 2020) (hereinafter, “economic impact 
assessment”).
51
Id. at Table 2.3, at 35.
52
The report also estimates that with a profitability threshold of 10 
percent and a €750 million threshold the great majority of in-scope 
residual profits (70 to 85 percent) is concentrated among 60 MNE 
groups.
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substantial simplification by eliminating many 
MNEs from the scope of pillar 1 at a relatively 
small cost in revenues to market jurisdictions.
Including all in-scope profits, rather than just 
residual profits, in the allocation of amount A to 
market/user jurisdictions, as suggested here, also 
allows greater potential simplification with 
relatively little revenue cost from moving the 
threshold up from €750 million to €2 billion, or 
perhaps even higher.
III. Offsetting Amount A
As I have described, the OECD concluded that 
allocating amount A to market/user countries 
should not cause a tax on in-scope MNEs’ profits 
in more than one country and would require 
additional taxes from MNEs only when profits are 
allocated from lower- to higher-tax countries. So 
the blueprint requires that the amount A 
allocation of some profits to market countries 
needs to be offset by a reduction of taxes currently 
allocated elsewhere under arm’s-length transfer 
pricing. This makes it necessary to specify which 
entities in what jurisdictions will have their taxes 
reduced, or as the OECD puts it, to specify the 
paying entities. The blueprint details its method 
for such offsets in a complex four-stage process 
that takes 14 pages to describe and reaches results 
that are often ambiguous and will inevitably be 
controversial.
Identifying the paying entities under the pillar 
1 blueprint requires several steps. First, each 
paying entity must have residual profits (as 
before, a profit margin in excess of a profitability 
threshold, such as 10 percent of revenues). This 
would eliminate several MNE’s entities as 
potential paying entities. The blueprint then 
requires further inquiries or tests to identify an 
entity’s contributions to the residual profits 
allocated under amount A. There is also a priority 
test based on an entity’s connection to the market 
jurisdiction, which turns on the activities an entity 
performs to make “a material and sustained 
contribution to [the] MNE’s residual profits.”53 
Other amounts would be allocated pro rata.
The blueprint also suggests using an 
exemption method and/or a foreign tax credit 
method to eliminate double taxation, even though 
simply exempting an entity’s portion of amount A 
from its taxable income would be far simpler. To 
achieve tax certainty, the computation of the 
exempt (or creditable) amount must be approved 
by all the relevant jurisdictions. If they fail to 
agree, binding arbitration by a determination 
panel follows.54
Under these complex determinations, 
uncontroversial, predictable, and certain 
outcomes are a mirage. Offsets for amount A 
should instead be based on a pro rata reduction of 
profits taken from readily available financial 
information. As under the blueprint, the paying 
entities should be limited to those that earn 
residual returns, even though a portion of all in-
scope profits would be allocated to market/user 
countries under the regime I have proposed here.
Limiting offsets by paying entities to residual 
returns is appropriate because mobile residual 
profits from IP (and in some cases financial 
transactions) are often shifted to lower- or zero-
tax jurisdictions. Related entities in some 
jurisdictions are allocated only a relatively small 
cost plus markup on their activities under current 
transfer pricing rules, and it does not seem proper 
to offset amount A by reducing profits now taxed 
in jurisdictions where only such profits are 
earned. The OECD’s economic assessment of 
pillar 1 concludes that most of the offsets under its 
method for determining paying entities come 
from income currently allocated to affiliates in 
investment hubs.55
The blueprint’s method of limiting offsets to 
residual profits of paying entities only to lines of 
business closely linked to amount A again 
introduces unnecessary complexities and the 
potential for controversies. Instead, a pro rata 
offset to determine the paying entities of an in-
scope MNE, excluding only entities that earn a 
routine return (based on a specified profit 
threshold) would be simpler and minimize 
controversies. This would also require offsets 
from financial hubs in low- or zero-tax 
jurisdictions that are allocated more than routine 
profits.
53
Pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at ch. 7 and 212.
54
Id. at ch. 7 and 214.
55
Economic impact assessment, supra note 50, at ch. 2.
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Because the fixed percentage of profits to be 
allocated to market/user countries would be 
based on worldwide income on financial reports, 
it is appropriate to use a financial reporting 
measure of paying entities’ profits (rather than 
taxable income) to determine the paying entities’ 
offsets. Unfortunately, however, the consolidated 
worldwide reports used for determining the total 
profits allocated to market countries are not apt: 
They do not show entity-by-entity profits in 
particular jurisdictions, which is the information 
necessary to determine paying entities’ offsets. 
Using existing sources of data, therefore, requires 
basing these offsets on country-by-country 
reports.56 Using a pro rata reduction of entities’ 
residual profits (profits above a specified 
threshold) based on an in-scope MNE’s CbC 
reporting of profits would greatly narrow the 
scope of the potential controversies. There would 
be no need to determine whether the paying 
entities themselves are in scope or to link their 
activities to those of particular market or user 
jurisdictions. Allocating costs to particular entities 
for determining their share of residual profits also 
would not be necessary as it is under the 
blueprint. Costs are already taken into account in 
entities’ CbC submissions. Profits are stated in 
CbC reports for all countries where there is a legal 
entity (often a subsidiary but sometimes a 
partnership) or a branch regarded as a PE within 
a jurisdiction, as are profits of any constituent 
entity that is transparent for tax purposes in its 
local jurisdiction.57 One reason the OECD offers 
for rejecting the use of consolidated financial 
statements to determine offsets is their 
elimination of intercompany transactions, which 
the OECD regards as inappropriate for this 
purpose. These transactions are not eliminated in 
CbC reports. Beginning in December 2020, 
however, CbC reporting eliminates intercompany 
dividends, an adjustment that is appropriate here. 
Stateless income, which is double counted in a 
parent company’s CbC reports, should also be 
eliminated here.
CbC reports are not perfect sources of 
financial information for this purpose. CbC 
reports are generally based on financial 
statements for financial reporting or regulatory 
purposes — which is consistent with the use of 
book profits, rather than taxable income, to 
determine the amount of profit allocated to 
market/user countries — but taxpayers have 
flexibility to use records developed for internal 
management or tax reporting purposes for CbC 
reports. That flexibility may prompt some 
gamesmanship by MNEs. But because the total 
amount of the reductions of income in various 
entities must add up to 100 percent of amounts A 
allocated to market countries, the incentives for 
such games should be relatively small. My 
approach for determining offsets of paying 
entities might also create an impetus to require 
more uniformity in CbC reports based on IFRS (or 
GAAP where applicable) financial reporting.
IV. An Alternative Proposal
In summary, this is how the system proposed 
here would work. First, isolate all MNEs above a 
specified threshold of sales or revenues that are 
engaged in consumer-facing business or ADS and 
therefore are in scope. Allocate a fixed percentage 
of the MNE’s worldwide book profits to market/
user countries, based on each country’s 
percentage of sales or revenues (amount A). Next, 
offset the taxable income of the MNE’s affiliated 
entities by the total of amounts A allocated to 
market countries by reducing the entities’ local 
pro rata shares of CbC positive residual profits 
(profits above a specified threshold) to the MNE’s 
total worldwide CbC positive profits (with 
stateless income reported by parent entities 
eliminated). All other taxable income would 
continue to be determined under existing transfer 
pricing principles.
Assuming an MNE meets the basic revenue 
threshold and is in scope, its tax base in a 
particular country would be increased by the 
following calculation:
(C * f)(S/W - P/T)
where C equals worldwide in-scope profits from 
financial statements;
f is the fixed percentage of all in-scope profits to 
be allocated to market/user countries;
56
This is an important source of information used by the OECD in 
estimating the share of residual profits in particular jurisdictions. Id. at 
29-30.
57
See, e.g., IRS Form 8975 and its instructions.
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S is local sales and/or revenues from ADS;
W is worldwide sales and/or revenue from ADS 
(the sum of all Ss);
P is positive local profits above a specified 
threshold of profits of in-scope entities based on 
CbC reporting; and
T is the total worldwide sum of all Ps.58
This calculation follows the fundamental 
policies and basic structure of the pillar 1 
blueprint’s allocation of a formulary portion of in-
scope MNE profits to market/user countries while 
eliminating double taxation.59 But it is 
dramatically simpler and will produce clear and 
certain outcomes, which the pillar 1 blueprint fails 
to do.
V. Achieving Tax Certainty
The OECD insists in its pillar 1 blueprint that 
achieving tax certainty is essential.60 It endeavors 
to ensure certainty by adopting new mandatory 
dispute prevention procedures and dispute 
resolution institutions. These are commendable 
efforts, but the difficulty is that the blueprint’s 
complex methods of determining amount A and 
offsets from paying entities open too many 
potential avenues for controversies. It is virtually 
impossible to have confidence that any dispute 
resolution process can achieve predictable and 
certain results. Here is how the blueprint 
describes potential controversies:
Such disputes could concern, for example, 
the correct delineation of business lines, 
allocation of central costs and tax losses to 
business lines, the existence of a nexus in a 
particular jurisdiction, or the 
identification of the relieving jurisdictions 
for purposes of elimination double 
taxation.61
The simplifications described here would 
substantially narrow the potential controversies. 
Lines would still need to be drawn to determine 
which business activities are in scope and which 
are out of scope. But the amount to be allocated to 
the market/user countries would simply be a fixed 
percentage of all in-scope MNE profits based on 
financial reporting. The amount so allocated 
would then be offset by a reduction of the MNE’s 
entities’ taxable income in their local jurisdictions 
based on the entities’ pro rata allocation of 
positive profits in excess of a specified threshold, 
based on data readily available from CbC 
reporting.
These major simplifications of pillar 1 would 
eliminate most of the issues and controversies that 
would arise under the blueprint. Successful 
implementation of the mandatory dispute 
resolution procedures of the sort set forth in 
chapter 9 of the blueprint could then succeed in 
resolving controversies. Importantly, the 
prospects of achieving the essential OECD goal of 
ensuring tax certainty would also become 
realistic.
VI. Conclusion
No one seems happy with the OECD’s pillar 1 
blueprint. Borrowing from Tolstoy, much 
unhappiness is being expressed in its own way. 
Some simply want to torpedo the project. The 
position of the United States, expressed in 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s insistence 
that the pillar 1 allocation to market countries not 
58
Where T (the sum of all positive residual profits) is less than (C * f) 
(the total of amounts A to be allocated based on worldwide profits from 
financial statements), the formula in the text will not produce 
appropriate offsets. In such cases, f (the percentage of profits to be 
allocated to market/user countries) cannot exceed T/C. So f should be 
interpreted to be the lesser of the fixed percentage or the ratio of T to C. 
If, for example, f is equal to 10 percent, amount A will be reduced for 
MNEs that have total positive residual profits less than 10 percent of all 
profits. In such cases, the amounts A to be allocated will equal T, the sum 
of all positive residual profits from CbC reports.
59
This can be shown by comparing the equation in the text to a 
formula that the OECD has used in describing pillar 1. The formula 
indicates that the tax base increase for a country is the global residual 
profit allocated times the country’s share of in-scope MNE sales profits 
reduced by the country’s share of residual profits. This formula is 
contained in slide 29 of the slides for a February 13 OECD presentation 
on pillar 1. OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising From the Digitalisation of 
the Economy — Update on the Economic Analysis & Impact 
Assessment,” OECD Webcast, Feb. 13, 2020. Another somewhat more 
detailed and realistic version of the formula can be found in the 
economic impact assessment, supra note 50, at 29.
In the notation of the text, if G = Global residual profit allocated and 
Q = share of residual profit, the formula in the slide is G(S/W - Q/T), 
which is structurally similar to the formula in the text. However, the C * f 
in the text is much easier to determine than G, which is shown as y[P - (R 
* z)] in Annex B of the pillar 1 blueprint, supra note 1, at 215. (P in that 
formula is comparable to C above, R is the revenues of a group or 
segment, z is equivalent to f above, and y is an agreed portion of residual 
profit attributable to amount A.) P/T in the text is also much easier to 
calculate than Q/T for reasons described in the text of this article. The 
point here is simply to show the fundamental structural similarity of the 
much simpler mechanism of this article to the OECD’s blueprint.
60
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be mandatory, but instead some sort of a safe-
harbor regime, seems to fall into that category.62 
The secretary’s position, however, did not halt the 
project, and it allowed Treasury representatives to 
participate in OECD discussions of the technical 
issues. But Mnuchin might just as well have said 
that the United States opposes the pillar 1 effort.
Many other objections to the pillar 1 blueprint, 
however, are well justified. Businesses that will 
have to comply with pillar 1 are properly 
concerned with its complexities and attendant 
compliance costs; the ambiguities in its 
application, which threaten multiple and 
overlapping claims to revenue; and the practical 
challenges of achieving the level of certainty in its 
application that the blueprint promises. Many 
countries rightly worry about their ability to 
administer the rules described in the blueprint.
The incoming Biden administration will no 
doubt reevaluate the U.S. position because, as I 
have said, it is foolish to think that the status quo 
predating these OECD efforts is an appropriate 
baseline for comparison. Instead, market/user 
jurisdictions will continue to develop and impose 
new and varying taxes based on the use of digital 
services and sales of goods and services in their 
jurisdictions. Pillar 1 is intended to substitute a 
multilateral agreement on the allocation of some 
profits to those jurisdictions for the many 
different unilateral regimes that are emerging and 
will emerge — and for the retaliatory tariffs and 
other trade measures that have been promised 
and seem likely to occur in response.
The 230 pages of details in the pillar 1 
blueprint obscure its underlying principles. Of 
course, it is difficult to discern clear principles in 
a structure that uses arm’s-length transfer pricing 
to allocate the great majority of profits and a 
formulary method of apportionment to allocate a 
limited portion of residual profits to market/user 
countries. Nor is there an obvious principle that 
yields clear answers to the question of where the 
offsets to the reallocation of amount A to 
eliminate double taxation should come from. The 
mechanisms in the OECD’s pillar 1 blueprint to 
allocate some relatively small portion of residual 
profits to user countries produce great complexity 
without eliminating transfer pricing disputes or 
concerns with income shifting of proponents of 
allocating all residual profits based on sales and 
digital services.63 Nevertheless, success of the 
OECD’s effort is important.
In my view, the best path forward lies in a 
dramatic simplification of the pillar 1 proposal. 
While working within the OECD’s basic 
framework, I have demonstrated how 
substituting formulary apportionment of a 
smaller percentage of all profits, rather than 
attempting to allocate an arbitrary percentage of 
residual profits to market/user jurisdictions, and 
requiring MNE entities to share in that allocation 
based on their pro rata shares of residual profits 
offer the potential for a major simplification of 
pillar 1 that also avoids double taxation. The 
proposal here is based on readily available 
financial information and avoids debatable 
segmentations, with inevitably controversial 
revenue and cost allocations, as well as 
contestable efforts to link an MNE’s particular 
entities to specific market jurisdictions that would 
benefit from the reallocations of amount A. All of 
these inevitably will create controversies that 
undermine the OECD’s quest for certainty, despite 
its efforts to institute new mandatory dispute 
resolution arrangements.
Architects of the OECD pillar 1 blueprint may 
complain that the pro rata allocations urged here 
sacrifice the blueprint’s fidelity to greater 
precision for unscientific outcomes. But, in my 
view, the blueprint’s veneer of preciseness sows 
seeds for pillar 1’s downfall, and its promise of 
certain outcomes is a chimera. 
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Letter from Mnuchin to OECD Secretary-General José Ángel Gurría 
(Dec. 3, 2019).
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See, e.g., Devereux et al., supra note 7; and Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and 
Durst, supra note 7.
©
 2021 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
































Electronic copy available t: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3763919
